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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 


















BRIEF ON REMEDIAL ISSUES 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant Price Waterhouse is entitled to judgment in 
this case because its decision in 1983 to defer plaintiff's 
partnership candidacy was independently predicated upon 
plaintiff's conduct quite apart from any consideration of her 
gender. However, if the Court finds for plaintiff on 
liability, for the following reasons the judgment in her favor 
should be limited to no more than back pay in an amount equal 
to the difference between the income of a beginning Price 
Waterhouse partner and the amount plaintiff actually earned for 
the period July 1, 1983 through June 30, 1984: 
1. Plaintiff is not entitled to a judicially imposed 
partnership in the Price Waterhouse firm. 
(a) The Court has no authority under Title VII 
to create a partnership by judicial decree; and 
(b) This is not an appropriate case for an 
equitable decree mandating a partnership because: 
(i) Due to deficiencies in her 
interpersonal skills, plaintiff was not and 
is not qualified to be a Price Waterhouse 
partner; 
(ii) Plaintiff is not qualified 
technically to be a Price Waterhouse partner 
and has made no showing that a suitable 
position is available for her in the 
Washington, D.C. management consulting 
practice of the Price Waterhouse firm; and 
(iii) A partnership in a 
professional, collegial firm is an 
inappropriate equitable remedy because the 
Court is not in a position to determine 
where and under what circumstances plaintiff 
should be made a partner or to supervise 
that intensely personal, intimate and 
ongoing relationship. 
2. If the Court finds in favor of plaintiff on 
liability, she is entitled to back pay of no more than one 
year's differential between what she would have earned and what 
she did earn because: 
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(a) Plaintiff made a deliberate and conscious 
decision to commence her own business in January of 1984 and to 
commit herself to that enterprise for several years thereafter. 
(b) Plaintiff was qualified for and, with 
reasonable efforts, could have obtained employment comparable 
in earning potential and in her field to the position to which 
she aspired at Price Waterhouse. She failed to make any 
reasonable efforts to seek such employment at major accounting 
firms or at any of the many other consulting firms that did 
work in her field. She failed adequately to consult with or 
employ executive placement firms or to seek comparable 
employment outside Washington. Plaintiff's decision to 
initiate and operate her own firm was not a reasonable effort 
to mitigate damages. Had she made reasonable efforts, she 
would have secured a comparable position in the ten months 
between the time she was told she would not be reproposed for 
partner and June 30, 1984. 
3. Plaintiff is not entitled to a front pay award 
and her calculations as to the amount of front pay to which she 
is entitled are unsupportable and speculative. 
(a) Plaintiff could certainly have obtained 
employment comparable to the partnership she did not attain at 
Price Waterhouse in the seven years since she was told of the 
decision not to repropose her for partnership. There were many 
comparable positions available in a field that was expanding 
explosively and it is entirely unreasonable to assume, as 
- 3 -
plaintiff has done, that Price Waterhouse is the only available 
opportunity for her to receive compensation at the level to 
which she aspires. 
(b) It is entirely too specul~tive to award 
plaintiff front pay based upon a Price Waterhouse partnership 
because plaintiff has not established: 
(i) That she would have 
remained a Price Waterhouse partner even if 
she had been advanced to partnership in 1983; 
(ii) That a Price Waterhouse 
partner would have earned the amounts 
plaintiff asks this Court to assume. 
4. Other injunctive relief is not warranted. 
Plaintiff has not shown that such relief is necessary. The 
evidence shows that Price Waterhouse took immediate and 
effective measures to respond fully and faithfully to this 




PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO NO RELIEF 
BECAUSE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE RENDERED FOR 
PRICE WATERHOUSE ON LIABILITY 
The "judgment against Price Waterhouse on liability" 
was reversed by the Supreme Court and remanded to the Court of 
Appeals "for further proceedings." Price Waterhouse v. 




accordingly vacated its 1987 mandate as well as the previous 
judgment of the District Court and remanded the case to the 
District Court "for further proceedings." August l, 1989 Order. 
The further proceedings to be conducted by this Court 
require de novo consideration of the question of the 
defendant's liability depending upon whether it would have made 
the same employment decision irrespective of plaintiff's 
gender. Only if the Court finds in favor of plaintiff on 
liability will it be necessary for the Court to proceed to make 
findings and render a judgment as to the appropriate remedy. 
The liability phase has been briefed separately on 
remand. As demonstrated at length in that material, there is 
an abundance of evidence that establishes that the plaintiff's 
candidacy for partnership would have been deferred for one year 
irrespective of her gender. Plaintiff's "conduct," not her 
gender, "provided ample justification for the complaints that 
formed the basis of the Policy Board's decision." Hopkins v. 
Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.D.C. 1985) 
(emphasis added). Plaintiff received more "no" votes in the 
partnership selection process than 85 of the other 88 
candidates. The weight given by Price Waterhouse to negative 
comments was not discriminatory . .Id, at 1116. And "Price 
Waterhouse had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for 
distinguishing between the plaintiff and the male partners with 
whom she compare(d] herself." .Id, at 1115. Therefore, unless 
the Court determines to give no weight at all to the complaints 
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about or objections to plaintiff' s "conduct" by over two-thirds 
of t he partners who evaluated her, concerns that were 
"clear(ly] . .. not fabricated" (Id. at 1114; emphasis added), 
it is evident that plaintiff's partnership candidacy would have 
received no more than a deferral recommendation in 1983. "The 
partners generally believe that Ann had a problem on 
interpersonal skills and that as a result she was evaluated 
evenhandedly 
Tr. a t 249. 
ff Testimony of Joseph E . Connor, 1990 
Plaintiff has been unable to deny that she had serious 
problems with her interpersonal skills that existed quite apart 
from any sexual stereotyping or tainted judgments by any of her 
evaluators. She and even her supporters on the staff 
acknowledged these shortcomings. 618 F. Supp. at 1114. These 
precise qualities constituted "a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for refusing to admit [plaintiff] to partnership." Id. 
Therefore, judgment should be rendered for Price Waterhouse on 
liability and no remedy is warranted. 
II 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED 
This Court determined, based upon a careful review of 
the evidence, that the decision not to repropose plaintiff for 
partner in August 1983 was the result of positions taken by two 
Price Waterhouse partners. With respect to those partners, the 
Court found, as to one, that there was "D..Q. proof that his 
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position was animated by animosity toward [plaintiff's] sex" 
and, as to the other, the Court found that he was "a credible 
witness" and "accept[ed]" his testimony that his decision was 
based upon "additional criticism of [plaintiff's] management 
style from staff members, having several conversations with the 
plaintiff, and reflecting on his previous experience with her 
work." 618 F. Supp. at 1114 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court 
determined that the "decision not to repropose was due to the 
unexpected position taken by the two partners ... and 
plaintiff has not proven that their actions were 
discriminatory." Id. at 1115. This finding was not appealed 
and must be considered the law of the case. 
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals did consider 
this Court's conclusion that plaintiff had not been 
constructively discharged. Plaintiff contended, inter alia, 
that the constructive discharge doctrine was not germane to 
decisions involving partnership tenure. "[S]ociety derives no 
value from requiring such individuals to stay [where] they are 
simply to pursue a Title VII claim." Original Br. of 
Appellant-Cross Appellee at 16. Plaintiff contended that "the 
relevant inquiry is mitigation of damages, which is far 
different than entitlement to relief RU .u. . [T]he fact 
that plaintiff left Price Waterhouse may have a bearing on the 
precise amount of relief owed her, but not on her right to 
relief in the first instance." .Id, at 17. 
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Altering the law of constructive discharge in this 
Circuit, the Court of Appeals reversed this Court's decision on 
constructive discharge, holding that Price Waterhouse's tainted 
"decision to deny ... partnership status, ... coupled with" 
the nondiscriminatory decision not to renominate "amounted to a 
constructive discharge." Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 
458, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Operating under the logical and 
legally sound assumption that a reversal of the decision on 
liability would vitiate the rulings on remedial issues, Price 
Waterhouse did not seek certiorari on the constructive 
discharge holding of the Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiff now takes the position that it is the law of 
the case that plaintiff was constructively discharged and that, 
if so, "assuming liability, plaintiff is entitled to relief." 
Pl. Post-Trial Brief On Relief Issues (filed April 13, 1990) 
("Pl. Br.") at 1. Plaintiff also apparently contends that if 
she was constructively discharged, she is 1™ facto entitled 
to a partnership . .Id at 2. 
Defendant will demonstrate in this portion of the 
brief the validity of the following points: 
1. The decision of the Court of Appeals with respect 
to constructive discharge has been vacated and is not the law 
of the case. 
2. The decision of the Court of Appeals with respect 
to constructive discharge was predicated upon a finding of 
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liability that has been vacated. A remedial finding predicated 
upon a vacated finding of liability should not and cannot be 
the law of the case. 
3. The law of the case doctrine should not apply to 
the constructive discharge ruling because that ruling creates 
an anomaly with the unappealed finding that the decision not to 
repropose was nondiscriminatory, which is equally entitled to 
be considered the law of the case. It would be awkward and 
unfair to apply the law of the case doctrine to the 
constructive discharge holding under such circumstances. 
4. If the constructive discharge decision and the 
finding of a nondiscriminatory decision not to repropose are 
both the law of this case, and either both or neither must be, 
then the constructive discharge decision is relevant, as 
plaintiff contended in the Court of Appeals, only as to 
mitigation of damages and the amount of relief to which she is 
entitled. The constructive discharge holding, even if 
considered in isolation, means only that plaintiff's 
resignation from the firm does not in and of itself terminate 
plaintiff's claim for relief. Plaintiff's resignation 
therefore remains a factor to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of plaintiff's efforts to minimize her losses 
after the 1983 hold decision. Moreover, as demonstrated in 
Part III of this brief, there were many opportunities available 
to plaintiff to mitigate her damages; her departure from Price 
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Waterhouse, whether or not a constructive discharge, did not in 
any way diminish the alternatives available to her. 
A. The Law of the Case Doctrine 
The "law of the case is an amorphous concept." 
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). "As most 
commonly defined, the doctrine posits that when a court decides 
upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the 
same issues in subsequent stages in the same case." .Id. 
However, the doctrine is not immutable. s.e..e Safir v. ~' 718 
F.2d 475, 481 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Application of the 
doctrine is in any event discretionary .... "),cert.denied, 
467 U.S. 1206 (1984). For example, when there "has been a 
change in the factual matrix in which the first decision was 
rendered," courts will depart from a previous decision of a 
question of law. lB J. Moore, J. Lucas, & T. Currier, Moore's 
Federal Practice, 0.404(4-6], at 146-47 (2d ed. 1988) 
("Moore's Federal Practice"). Other factors, such as "the 
alternative and hence unnecessary character of an original 
pronouncement," also have been thought to "justify a departure 
from the usual principles of law of the case.• Halperin v. 
Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.). 
The "mandate rule" is a "specific application" of the 
law of the case doctrine, which articulates the general 
proposition that a "lower court is bound by the mandate of a 
federal appellate court as the law of the case and, generally, 
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is without power to reconsider issues decided on a previous 
appeal." Maggard v. O'Connell, 703 F.2d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 
1983); see also City of Cleveland v. Federal Power Commission, 
561 F.2d 344, 346-47 (D.C. Cir. 1977). However, the "law of 
the case does not apply to a finding that is later vacated." 
Dorsey v. Continental Casualty Co., 730 F.2d 675, 678 (11th 
Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original). 
B. The Court of Appeals vacated Its Own Mandate. 
Judgment And Opinion. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' 
judgment against Price Waterhouse on liability and remanded the 
case to that Court for further proceedings. Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1795 (1989). The Court of Appeals 
on remand issued an order vacating both its 1987 "mandate" and 
the judgment of this Court and remanded the case to this Court 
for "further proceedings." August 1, 1989 Order. 
Prior to the trial on remand, and even during the 
trial, plaintiff conceded that the Court of Appeals had vacated 
its 1987 opinion: "We recognize that [the Court of Appeals'] 
opinion was vacated following the Supreme Court's 
decision. • Pl. Pretrial Br. On Remedy, at 5 (filed Jan. 
17, 1990). ~ .a..l.a.o. 1990 Tr. at 86 ("we think that [the Court 
of Appeals' decision] had be[en] vacated."). Plaintiff has 
reversed course, however, and now argues that "[w]hile the 
Court of Appeals vacated its own mandate, its opinion on 
constructive discharge remains the law of the case." Pl. Br. 
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at 4. 11 However, plaintiff was correct the first time. In 
this Circuit, the "mandate" of the Court of Appeals "consist[s] 
of ... the Court's opinion and judgment." City of Cleveland 
v. Federal Power Commission, 561 F.2d 344, 347 n.25 {D.C. Cir. 
1977) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 4l(a)); ™' ~, Johnson v. 
Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., 801 F.2d 412, 415 {D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (the opinion and judgment constitute the mandate of 
the Court of Appeals) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 4l(a)). Indeed, 
the Court of Appeals' internal operating procedures expressly 
provide: "This Circuit does not utilize a formal document 
called a mandate. Rather the Clerk issues a certified copy of 
the judgment and the opinion ... of the Court in lieu of 
mandate. The rules and the Court's orders refer to that 
document as 'the mandate.'"11 
l/ Had defendant been aware in the fall of 1989 when decisions 
were being made with respect to whether to reopen the 
evidentiary phase of the liability portion of this trial that 
plaintiff would argue that the Court of Appeals' constructive 
discharge decision was binding as the law of the case, 
defendant undoubtedly would have sought to avail itself of the 
opportunity to introduce additional evidence relating to the 
1983 hold decision and its effects, if any, on plaintiff's 
prospects for reproposal the following year and on her decision 
to resign from the firm. However, at the time, as noted above, 
plaintiff was agreeing with defendant that the constructive 
discharge opinion had been vacated. At this late date, 
plaintiff should not be permitted to undercut defendant's 
justifiable reliance on plaintiff's litigation position in this 
case. Sil~ infra note 7. 
11 Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures, United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, XII (2) 
{Aug. 1, 1987) {emphasis added). This practice is expressly 
[Footnote continued on next page] 
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In December 1987 the Court of Appeals transmitted to 
this Court its "mandate," i.e., its judgment and opinion of 
August 4, 1987.~/ This mandate, i.e., the opinion and 
judgment of August 4, 1987, was vacated by the Court of 
Appeals' August 1, 1989 Order. 
Once the Court of Appeals vacated its August 4 , 1987 
opinion, that opinion lost any precedential and binding effect 
it might have had at a later stage in the proceedings. 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975); Johnson 
v. Board of Education, 457 U.S. 52 (1982); ~ _g_il.Q. Pl. Br. 
at 4 (the law of the case "doctrine does not apply to findings 
that are 'integral' to a vacated judgment of the higher court") 
(citation omitted).!/ 
~/ [Footnote continued from previous page] 
authorized by Rule 4l(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which provides: "A certified copy of the judgment 
and a copy of the opinion of the court, if any, and any 
direction as to costs shall constitute .t.M mandate, unless the 
court directs that a formal mandate issue." (emphasis added). 
l/ Letter from George A. Fisher to James F. Davey (Dec. 8, 
1987) ("Pursuant to ... Rule 4l(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, transmitted herewith, in lieu of formal 
mandate, is a copy of this Court's Opinion and a certified copy 
of the Judgment, both filed August 4, 1987."). 
!/ Although plaintiff makes much of the fact that the Supreme 
Court "left undisturbed the Court of Appeals' findings and 
conclusions on relief," Pl. Br. at 4, she does not claim that 
any of the opinions by the Justices addressed the merits of 
remedial issues. ~ i,d. at 3 ("The Supreme Court took pains 
not to decide, disapprove or even discuss the Court of Appeals' 
ruling on constructive discharge."). The plurality opinion 
expressly stated that "[w]e are concerned today .o.n.lY with Price 
Waterhouse's decision to place Hopkins' candidacy Q1l h.Q.lg_." 
109 s. Ct. at 1781 n.l (emphasis added). 
- 13 -
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals' August 1989 Order 
on remand does not define or limit the scope of the "further 
proceedings" to be conducted or the issues to be decided.~/ 
And this Court is free to decide any issue not foreclosed by 
the directives of the Court of Appeals, including remedial 
issues such as the effect of plaintiff ' s resignation from Price 
Waterhouse on the issue of appropriate relief. See,~, 
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n.18 (1979) {"'While a 
mandate is controlling as to matters within its compass, on the 
remand a lower court is free as to other issues.'") {citation 
omitted); Moore's Federal Practice, ,r 0.404(10], at 172-73 
{"When the remand is general ... the district court is free 
to decide anything not foreclosed by the mandate."). 
c. The Decision of The court of Appeals With Respect 
To constructive Discharge Is A Remedial Ruling 
That Was Predicated On A Finding Of Liability 
That Has Been Reversed And vacated. 
The Court of Appeals' constructive discharge holding 
was a remedial ruling only and was predicated on a finding of 
Title VII liability that has been reversed by the Supreme 
Court. The reversal of the judgment against Price Waterhouse 
on liability requires a fresh determination of the effect of 
plaintiff's resignation on the issue of appropriate relief. 
2/ When the Court of Appeals vacated its 1987 "mandate," which 
had reversed this Court's ruling on constructive discharge and 
ordered this Court to conduct remedial proceedings in light of 
that holding, it ·necessarily reopened the full panoply of 
remedial issues presented. 
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Plaintiff has contended throughout these and related 
proceedings that the liability and remedial issues in this case 
are intimately related. In her amended EEOC complaint~/ and 
her complaint in this case, plaintiff advanced a separate cause 
of action for "retaliation," "harassment" and "constructive 
discharge" premised on Price Waterhouse's treatment of her 
after the 1983 decision to defer her partnership candidacy. 
Plaintiff withdrew this claim before trial.l/ 1985 Tr. at 
139; ~ 618 F. Supp. at 1121. Instead, plaintiff argued that 
the "refusal to re-propose plaintiff for partner . and 
. the firm's earlier decision to place her on hold are. 
closely related and are part of a continuing process," and 
contended that both decisions violated Title VII. Plaintiff's 
Post-Trial Br. at 30 (1985). But this Court expressly rejected 
plaintiff's contention that the second decision violated Title 
VII and plaintiff did not pursue that issue on appeal. 
~/ Def. Ex. 57. 
1/ The only reference to constructive discharge in the briefs 
submitted in the District Court during the first trial is the 
statement in footnote 1 of Defendant's Post-Trial Brief (1985) 
in which Price Waterhouse noted that plaintiff's resignation 
cut off her remedial rights because plaintiff had withdrawn her 
claim of constructive discharge. Plaintiff responded that 
Price Waterhouse was "invit[ing] this Court to prejudge and 
wrongly limit the relief to be given plaintiff," but did not 
mention constructive discharge, and, indeed, appeared to reject 
the applicability in partnership cases of the doctrine's basic 
premise that a Title VII plaintiff "must continue to work for 
[the defendant] or else forfeit her remedies ... until she 
can secure a final favorable court judgment." Pl. Post-Trial 
Reply Br. at 12 n.8 (1985). ~~supra page 7. 
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The Court of Appeals' remedial ruling on constructive 
discharge was intimately bound up with its determination of 
Title VII liability. See 825 F.2d at 463, 473. It was 
predicated on a fact-based inquiry into the circumstances and 
effect of the alleged Title VII violation -- the 1983 hold 
decision -- and that finding of liability has been reversed. 
In this context, it is necessary for the Court to review~ 
novo all the facts relative to an appropriate remedy in light 
of the entire record on remand. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that a partial new 
trial is permissible only where it "clearly appears that the 
issue to be retried is so distinct and separate from the others 
that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice." 
Gasoline Products co, v. Champlin Refining co,, 283 u.s. 494, 
500 (1931). Thus, in Gasoline Products. the Court reversed the 
First Circuit's decision remanding a case for a new trial 
limited to the issue of damages and ordered a new trial as to 
"all of the issues raised" because "the question of 
damages . is so interwoven with that of liability that the 
former cannot be submitted to the jury independently of the 
latter without confusiqn and uncertainty, which amount to a 
denial of a fair trial." l_d. 500-01; ~, ~, Camalier & 
Buckley-Madison. Inc, v. Madison Hotel. Inc., 513 F.2d 407, 
420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (reversing on issue of liability alone 
but ordering new trial on both liability and damages because, 
"a new trial may be limited to less than all of the issues 
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raised in the case" only where "error ... leaves the verdict 
on completely separate issues uninfected");~~ Turner v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 809 F.2d 90, 103 n.13 (1st Cir. 1986). 
D. There Are Inconsistencies Between The 
Constructive Discharge Ruling And The Unappealed 
Finding That the Decision Not To Repropose Was 
Nondiscriminatory. 
The Court of Appeals' ruling with respect to 
constructive discharge presents a confusing anomaly when 
juxtaposed with this Court's unappealed ruling that the OGS 
decision not to repropose plaintiff for partnership was not 
discriminatory. This apparent inconsistency is undoubtedly the 
cause of the confusion that has mystified both this Court and 
the litigants in attempting to rationalize the Court of 
Appeals' decision. 
The evidentiary record plainly supports this Court's 
conclusion that plaintiff's own conduct contributed 
significantly to the OGS decision not to repropose her for 
partnership. 1985 Tr. at 387-88, 410-11. After the 1983 
decision to defer her partnership candidacy, plaintiff 
mischaracterized to an OGS partner the nature and substance of 
a conversation she had had with the Chairman and Senior Partner 
of Price Waterhouse, Joseph E. Connor, regarding her prospects 
at the firm. Her conduct was perceived as an effort to 
"intimidate" other partners to support her partnership 
candidacy in 1984. ~ 1985 Tr. at 387-88, 410-11. This 
incident, and other factors, not any sex-based animus, led the 
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partner, who had supported plaintiff's 1983 candidacy, to 
withdraw his support of plaintiff's 1984 partnership 
candidacy.~/ The decision of this partner and another 
partner to oppose plaintiff's candidacy resulted in the 
decision not to renominate plaintiff for partnership in 1984. 
618 F. Supp. at 1115. The Court carefully and thoroughly 
evaluated this evidence and reached the conclusion, which 
plaintiff did not even challenge on appeal, that the decision 
not to repropose was not discriminatory. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with this Court that the 
"mere fact of discrimination, without more" {825 F.2d at 473) 
is insufficient to make out a claim of constructive discharge. 
However, the Court of Appeals held that the act of 
discrimination to defer plaintiff's partnership candidacy, 
"coupled" with the nondiscriminatory failure to renominate 
"would have been viewed ... as a career-ending action" and 
therefore amounted to a constructive discharge . .Id, The 
anomaly created by these unusual and somewhat inconsistent 
conclusions makes it awkward and unjust to apply the law of the 
case doctrine to the constructive discharge decision. 
Therefore, the "'good sense and wise judicial practice' that 
informs the law-of-the-case doctrine," Halperin. 807 F.2d at 
~/ This partner testified to other difficulties that he 
encountered with plaintiff after the hold decision involving 
her inability to deal with colleagues in an acceptable 
fashion. 1985 Tr. at 388-89, 410. 
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193 (citations omitted), precludes its application to the 
constructive discharge ruling of the Court of Appeals. 
E. The Constructive Discharge Holding Is Relevant 
Only As To Mitigation Of Damages And The Amount 
Of Relief To Which Plaintiff Is Entitled. 
Either all the remedial issues not considered by the 
Supreme Court's opinion are open for reconsideration d..e. !l.QYQ on 
remand, or none of them are. If the Court of Appeals' 1987 
opinion establishes the law of the case with respect to 
constructive discharge, then this Court's decision, undisturbed 
on appeal, that the failure to repropose plaintiff for 
partnership did not violate Title VII is also the law of the 
case. 
If this Court decides to accept as established both 
the constructive discharge holding and the conclusion that the 
OGS decision not to repropose was nondiscriminatory, then the 
Court of Appeals' constructive discharge ruling is relevant, as 
plaintiff contended in the Court of Appeals, only to the issue 
of "mitigation of damages, which is far different than 
entitlement to relief ruu. ~." Original Br. of Appellant-Cross 
Appellee at 17-18. Thus, it is simply a factor to be 
considered in determining the amount of relief to which 
plaintiff may be entitled . .Id. 
In fact, it is well settled that the constructive 
discharge doctrine is nothing more than a specific application 
in the employment context of the principles of mitigation of 
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damages and "avoidable consequences." For example, in Clark v. 
Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C . Cir. 1981), accepted as still valid 
by the Court of Appeals in this case, the Court of Appeals 
recognized that, upon perceiving discriminatory conduct, a 
"Title VII plaintiff must ... 'mitigate damages by remaining 
on the job' .... " Id. at 1173 (quoting Bourgue v. Powell 
Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980)). Similarly, 
in Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 
1977), the First Circuit observed that the constructive 
discharge rule inquires into the reasonableness of a 
plaintiff's efforts to avoid and minimize his or her losses 
after an alleged Title VII violation has occurred, and thus "is 
comparable to the doctrine of avoidable consequences" under 
which an "employee cannot recover damages for losses that [the 
employee] could have avoided without risk of substantial loss 
or injury." .Id. at 119. 
If it is the law of the case, the Court of Appeals' 
holding with respect to constructive discharge stands for no 
more than the simple proposition that plaintiff's resignation 
from Price Waterhouse in January 1984 does not, in and of 
itself, cut off plaintiff's right to seek admission as a 
partner or post-resignation relief.~/ 825 F.2d at 472-73. 
~/ Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, Pl. Br. at 2, the Court 
of Appeals did not even remotely imply that an order requiring 
Price Waterhouse to make plaintiff a partner was "the 
[Footnote continued on next page] 
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That holding does not require the Court to ignore plaintiff's 
resignation, and the circumstances surrounding it, when 
considering the total mix of information concerning her efforts 
to mitigate any losses resulting from the 1983 hold decision. 
Under this analysis, plaintiff's decision to leave may have 
been understandable and does not preclude her from obtaining 
relief for some period after her resignation. But the nature 
and amount of her recovery may nonetheless be informed by the 
choices that were available to her in 1983 and 1984 and the 
Court's evaluation of the impact of her conduct and decisions 
on these choices. Nor would it preclude this Court from 
determining that while plaintiff was entitled to resign in 
January of 1984, her failure to be reproposed for partnership 
consideration later that year had been caused by her own 
conduct in 1983. ~'~,Doran v. Petroleum Management 
Corp,. 576 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1978) (after Court of Appeals ·,, 
' reversed district court's dismissal on statutory exemption 
grounds, and remanded, law of the case permitted district court 
to dismiss, on alternative basis of statute of limitations, an ~ 
i/ [Footnote continued from previous page] 




issue which it had not reached in the initial proceedings); see 
ll..S.Q. Maggard, 703 F.2d at 1289 (law of the case does not 
preclude litigation of issues on remand that were not 
previously decided "'either expressly or by necessary 
implication'") (citation omitted). 
Finally, even if this Court accepts the constructive 
discharge holding as binding on remand and plaintiff's 
resignation in January of 1984 is considered to be the 
equivalent of termination by the firm, the following section of 
this brief demonstrates that there were many comparable 
employment positions available to plaintiff had she exercised 
reasonable diligence, and her failure to obtain a comparable 
position was due solely to her own lack of diligence and her 




PLAINTIFF'S RELIEF, IF ANY, 
MUST BE LIMITED TO BACK PAY FOR THE 
PERIOD JULY 1, 1983 TO JUNE 30, 1984 
Plaintiff's Request For Partnership Admission Should 
Be Denied, 
As Price Waterhouse demonstrated in its previous 
submissions, plaintiff's request for a judicial decree making 
her a partner in the Price Waterhouse firm must be denied 
because Title VII's remedial scheme provides only for 
"reinstatement or hiring of employees," 42 u.s.c § 2000-S(g) 
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(emphasis added), and does not empower courts to force 
individuals to join with one another as partners in a 
professional business enterprise . .l.Q./ Furthermore, whether 
plaintiff was constructively discharged or not, it would be 
inappropriate and inequitable to force the partners of Price 
Waterhouse to accept an individual into the partnership whose 
conduct towards subordinates was unacceptable and whose conduct 
caused her not to be reproposed by her practice group in 1984. 
A court should not force someone who manifests an 
"[i]nability to get along with staff or peers," 618 F. Supp. 
at 1114, into a professional and collegial body where the 
"interpersonal skills of prospective partners was properly an 
important part of [the firm's] written partnership evaluation 
criteria." .Id. As the Court noted during trial, it is "clear" 
from the record that plaintiff had "interpersonal 
difficulties." 1990 Tr. at 251. Under the circumstances, an 
order requiring Price Waterhouse to admit plaintiff as a 
partner could result, despite defendant's efforts to 
accommodate plaintiff's style, in disruption, friction and 
antagonism, and is unfair to all the partners who were judged 
by a more rigorous standard than plaintiff. ~ 1990 Tr. at 
247-50. It may also be damaging to the morale of subordinates 
.l.Q./ Def. Pre-Trial Br. on Remedial Issues at 4-7 (filed 
Jan. 17, 1990). Such relief also would interfere with 
associational freedoms protected by the First Amendment. Id. 
at 7-8. Thus, at most, plaintiff is entitled to a remedial 
order requiring that she be reconsidered for partnership 
without regard to her gender. _lg_. at 14. 
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requ i red t o work f or p l aint iff . Such relief shou l d theref ore 
be denied. ~ McIntosh v. Jones Truck Lines Inc., 767 F.2d 
433 , 435 n.l (8th Cir . 1985) (affirming denial of reinstatement 
based upon plaintiff's interpersonal deficiencies).ll/ 
The plaintiff has not cited and defendant is not aware 
of a single case in which a court has issued a remedial decree 
requiring the admission of an individual to a partnership. 
Even if that were to be a permissible and jurisprudentially 
appropriate course in some instances, this is not such a case. 
Finally, because of plaintiff's conscious decision to 
change career paths after she left Price Waterhouse, she has 
spent her past six years professionally occupied in a manner 
that is not consistent with the work she would have been doing 
or would be expected to do as a partner at Price Waterhouse. 
11/ Courts often refuse to order reinstatement where, due to 
interpersonal tension, ·,such relief would be unworkable and 
impractical. ~' ~,' Cassino v. Reichold Chemicals, 817 
F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987), .c.e.tl.. denied, 108 s. Ct. 785 
(1988). Moreover, high level executive and managerial 
positions have been distinguished from "assembly line or 
clerical" worker positI'ons to support denial of reinstatement 
when the position in questio~ ... require[s] a close working 
relationship between plaintiff and top executives of 
defendant." ~ v. Kallir. Phillips Ross. Inc. 420 F. Supp. 
919, 926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd without opinion. 559 F.2d 
1203 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 434 u.s. 920 (1977); ~ ~ 
Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Case (BNA) 
1309, 1321 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (rejecting reinstatement of 
executive because, inter tli.a., "unlike an unskilled worker, a 
person in an executive or management position must have the 
complete confidence of others in management"). Similarly, 
courts at common law refused to compel individuals to become 
partners because of the difficulties of effectively enforcing a 
decree that requires such close personal association. ~ 
Clark v~ Truitt. 183 Il~. 239, 55 N.E. 683, 685 (1899). 
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As the former Chairman of Price Waterhouse testified, "[t]here 
is no greater way to strike out in a professional firm than not 
[being] capable of running your act [Plaintiff] has 
not had that experience in the last couple of years." 1990 Tr. 
at 248. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is presently 
qualified to fulfill the duties of a Price Waterhouse partner 
and to serve the clients of the firm at the level expected of 
Price Waterhouse partners. The Court should therefore refuse 
to issue a decree compelling Price Waterhouse to admit her into 
the firm. 
B. Assuming Liability, Plaintiff's Monetary Relief Should 
Be Limited To Back Pav For A Limited Period Following 
July 1, 1983. 
Plaintiff seeks monetary relief for the remainder of 
her life, a 42-year period, dating from July 1, 1983 through 
"her life expectancy in 2025." Pl. Ex. A3. She seeks back pay 
for the period July 1, 1983 to June 30, 1989, and front pay in 
lieu of admission as a partner for "future losses." Sn id. 
However, plaintiff misapprehends the nature of the injury she 
sustained and the remedy to which she is entitled. At most she 
was denied an opportunity to advance to partner in a particular 
professional firm. She did not sustain an injury that 
prevented her from obtaining comparable work. She made some 
choices that affected her marketability, but Price Waterhouse 
did not permanently disable her from being a successful big 
systems management consultant when it deferred her partnership 
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candidacy in 1983. Plaintiff ' s failure to mitigate damages, 
and the speculativeness ~f her damages calculations, require 
that any monetary recovery be limited to back pay for a period 
beg i nning July 1, 1983 and ending not later than June 30, 1984. 
Plaintiff had a "statutory duty to minimize [her] 
damages" after the 1983 decision to defer her partnership 
candidacy. Ford Motor Co. v. ~, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982); 
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(g) (back pay awards must be reduced by 
"amounts earnable with reasonable diligence" during interim 
period between date of discrimination and judgment). "This 
duty, rooted in an ancient principle of law," Ford Motor Co., 
458 U.S. at 231, required plaintiff to act reasonably in 
seeking renomination to partnership at Price Waterhouse after 
her initial candidacy was deferred121 and, after the decision 
12/ As in the law of torts and contracts, under Title VII, 
plaintiffs must act reasonably to avoid the consequences of the defendant's alleged misconduct immediately upon perreiving it, and thereby mitigate their losses. ~ Clark v. M~____I_fill, 665 F.2d at 1173 (a "Title VII plaintiff must ... 'mitigate 
damages by remaining on the job'") (cit~tion ommitted). Thus, for example, a personal injury plaintiff must mitigate damages by promptly seeking medical treatment after discovering the 
injury. ~ 4 F. Harper, F. James & o. Gray, The Law of Torts 
§ 25.4, at 511-16 (2d ed. 1986). ~ generally c. McCormick, 
Handbook on the Law of Damages§§ 33-34 (1935). Similarly, in contract cases "after [a] plaintiff ... receive[s] notice of the breach," the plaintiff has a "duty to do nothing to 
increase the damages flowing therefrom." Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co,, 35 F.2d 301, 307 (4th Cir. 1929); ~, ~, Wessler v. City of St. Louis, 242 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951) ("m .t.h.e breach of a contract of employment, the employee is under compulsion to use reasonable diligence to obtain other gainful employment for the purpose of minimizing 
[Footnote continued on next page] 
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not to repropose her, to "use reasonable diligence in finding 
other suitable employment," i.d_., that is "substantially 
equivalent" to the position denied her. Hartman v. Wick, 678 
F. Supp. 312, 338 (D.D.C. 1988). Moreover, because Price 
Waterhouse is a nationwide partnership that regularly asks and 
expects its partners to transfer, 1990 Tr. at 239-41, and 
because plaintiff has admitted she was willing to take a 
position in a new location, i.d_. at 62-63, she had a duty to 
seek comparable employment in the national market for persons 
with her skills and experience. ~, ~, ~ v. Nicks, 741 
F.2d 858 (6th Cir. 1984) (because plaintiff admitted at trial 
she was "willing to relocate," she had an obligatinn to accept 
a position in a new location), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1216 
(1985); Cowen v. Standard Brands. 572 F. Supp. 1576, 1581 (N.D. 
Ala. 1983) (employee who can expect to be transferred must 
accept position in new city);™ .a..l..s..Q Joshi v. Florida State 
University Health Center, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 656, 
ll/ [Footnote continued from previous page] 
the resulting damages") (emphasis added). Plaintiffs cannot 
wait until they have obtained a favorable judgment that has 
been affirmed on appeal to mitigate damages. Indeed, this is 
precisely the result that the mitigation rule seeks to avoid, 
as demonstrated by Title VII's requirement that plaintiffs 
exercise reasonable diligence during the pendency of their 
claims. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). In order to "retain [the] right 
to compensation" pending a favorable decision, an employee must 
take reasonable steps to mitigate. Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 
232 n. 18. compare Cassino v. Reichold Chemicals. 817 F.2d 
1338, 1345 (9th Cir. 1987) (a discriminatorily discharged 
"plaintiff must attempt to mitigate damages by exercising 
reasonable care and diligence in seeking reemployment after 
termination.") (emphasis added). 
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658 (N . D. Fla . 1986) (plaintiff ' s limited search unreasonable 
because the "physician market is a national one"), aff'd 
without opinion, 845 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 836 (1989). 
Price Waterhouse demonstrated through various 
witnesses, and plaintiff was not able to refute, that "there 
were suitable positions available and that the plaintiff failed 
to use reasonable care in seeking them." Cassino. 817 F.2d at 
1345. The job market for persons with plaintiff's skills and 
experience has expanded steadily and substantially since 1983. 
1990 Tr. at 279-81. In 1984, there was a strong demand for 
management consultants like plaintiff at Big Eight accounting 
firms, large independent consulting firms, and within 
companies . .Id, Touche Ross expressed a specific interest in 
plaintiff (1990 Tr. at 179-80) and other Big Eight firms such 
as Arthur Andersen and Peat Marwick and Mitchell in addition to 
major management consulting firms like Booz Allen were looking 
for and hiring persons with plaintiff's skills and experience 
in 1984 . .s..e..e., L.9...r.., i,d. at 286; Def Ex. A7. Aside from the 
Big Eight firms, there were as many as 30-50 more firms in 
which plaintiff may have marketed her talents and have found 
comparable positions. 1990 Tr. at 289. 
Plaintiff did not even attempt to refute the evidence 
of available comparable positions. Indeed, both plaintiff 
(1990 Tr. at 37, 51-52) and her expert witness, an economist, 
admitted that they made no independent investigation into the 
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availability of comp a rable po s itions and s i mply t ook the 
position that plaintiff's independent consulting position and 
her World Bank position were " the best she [could] do." l_d. 
at 144-45 . Although plaintiff has asserted in her post-trial 
brief that it is "highly unlikely" that a person who fails to 
make partner at one Big Eight firm will be able to become a 
partner at another Big Eight firm, Pl. Br. at 9, she offered no 
evidence in support of this assertion, and it is flatly 
inconsistent with the record. ~, !L...9......, 1990 Tr. at 182, 
287-88 . In fact numerous Price Waterhouse employees who have 
failed to make partner have gone on to become partners in other 
Big Eight firms. ill ~, !L...9......, Def. Ex. A7. Touche Ross was 
willing to consider hiring plaintiff and putting her on a 
partnership track. 1990 Tr. at 178-81. But plaintiff refused 
to consider such a course and did not even pick up the phone to 
talk to any of the other Big Eight firms. 
The evidence shows not that it was difficult for 
someone leaving Price Waterhouse to become a partner at another 
firm, but that plaintiff refused to consider going to another 
firm unless she was made partner immediately. Id. at 46-47, 
179-80. She walked out of the meeting with Touche Ross the 
ll/ The names of over thirty such individuals were placed in evidence. As the Court noted, "within this group of larger accounting firms personnel were quite fungible and they could move back and forth at good money and the partnership thing is just one of those things that eventually hit with some place, one person one time, and another person another time." 1990 Tr. at 224. 
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instant she learned that she would not be a partner when she 
walked through the door. Id. at 179-80. 
After the 1983 hold decision, plaintiff was aware of 
"options" available to her for consulting positions that paid 
from $70,000 to $90,000 a year, 1985 Tr. at 115, compared with 
her $70,000 1983 salary level at Price Waterhouse. 1990 Tr. at 
33. She did not pursue those options then or after she 
resigned from Price Waterhouse . .Id. at 34. Although plaintiff 
claims the August 1983 OGS decision not to repropose her was a 
key factor in her decision to leave the firm, Pl. Br. at 7, she 
made no effort whatsoever to look for a new position prior to 
her resignation four months later. 1990 Tr. at 33. When she 
did leave, she immediately started her own business. _Id. 
After she resigned, plaintiff made virtually no 
efforts to work with executive recruiters. She claims to have 
contacted no more than four in writing, id. at 61, and, 
although represented in this case by counsel at the time, could 
produce no written evidence of .a.DY contact with executive 
placement firms. Plaintiff started her own consulting company 
as soon as she left Price Waterhouse. She thereafter viewed 
the search for a new position as a "secondary set of 
activities." _Id. at 49. 
Remarkably, plaintiff did not fill out a single 
application or otherwise "formal[ly] appl[y]" for a consulting 
position at any firm. 1990 Tr. at 48-49, 61-62. Similarly, 
plaintiff turned down an offer for a position with the 
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management consulting firm of Pinkerton Computer Consultants 
(1990 Tr. at 50); admitted she was not interested in attaining 
a position with Price Waterhouse's principal competitor in her 
specialty area; and declined the offer of an accounting firm to 
start a consulting practice for that firm . .Id. at 54-56. 
The simple fact is that plaintiff did virtually 
nothing to find employment that compared with the position to 
which she aspired at Price Waterhouse. Although she "agree[s] 
that [she] had a duty to mitigate after she left Price 
Waterhouse," she contends that she fulfilled that duty when she 
started her own consulting firm. Pl. Br. at 9. However, 
plaintiff does not and cannot argue that her independent 
consulting operation was "substantially equivalent," or even 
similar to, a Price Waterhouse partnership. It was in fact a 
"new and independent undertaking," Ford Motor Co •. 458 U.S. at 
234, which plaintiff has implicitly acknowledged posed 
significantly more business risks than a position similar to a 
Price Waterhouse partnership or staff position. ~, ~, 
Testimony of Ann B. Hopkins, 1990 Tr. at 25-26 (plaintiff 
ultimately ceased independent consulting because of "the ups 
and downs of workload and the cash flow" and the "overhead cost 
of managing the corporation"). A sole proprietorship could not 
possibly take advantage of plaintiff's expertise and skills as 
a big systems computer consultant. 
Plaintiff's single minded focus in 1984 on starting 
and developing her own business was evident from her 
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testimony. Over and over again she said that she decided "to 
devote my time and energy to developing a practice as a 
management consultant on my own." 1990 Tr. at 15. She showed 
mild curiosity as to what other opportunities existed but, she 
said, "my energy and my time and my focus was on my own 
practice." 1..d, at 19. "[T]he best course of action, given my 
experience and skills and assets was to develop a business of 
my own." 1..d, at 33; see also id. at 38, 43, 49, 51. 
Price Waterhouse cannot be required to "insure 
[plaintiff] against the risks" that she herself voluntarily 
assumed. Ford Motor Co,. 458 U.S. at 234; .s..e..e. .ill.Q Scott v. 
OCE Industries. Inc,, 536 F. Supp. 141, 149 (N.D. Ill. 1982) 
(plaintiff was entitled to no damages for the period subsequent 
to committing herself to an independent business •rather than 
the general employment market"); 5 A. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts§ 1095, at 518 (1964) (if a wrongfully discharged 
employee "chooses to engage in [the employee's own] business, 
investing capital therein, the risk of gain or loss should be 
[the employee's whose] damages should be measured by the wages 
promised less what [the employee] could earn by reasonable 
effort in a similar position of employment"). Plaintiff had 
reasons that were sufficient for her to start her own business 
and eschewed every other opportunity to work with any of Price 
Waterhouse's competitors or any comparable firm. But she 
cannot make such a choice and hold Price Waterhouse accountable 
for its financial implications. 
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Although a professional employee who has diligently 
searched for a comparable position with an established firm, 
and failed, might in an extreme case be justified in starting 
his or her own business in order to mitigate, that was not the 
case here. Plaintiff made no effort to seek a similar 
position, despite the availability of such positions. Before 
looking for any other job, she decided to devote her full time 
to developing a new business venture. 1990 Tr. at 15. 
Nor does plaintiff's position at the World Bank 
constitute a comparable position. In the first place, she did 
not go to work for the World Bank until 1988 when personal 
reasons caused her to abandon her own business and to take a 
salaried, quasi-governmental position . .l.d. at 25, 62. Second, 
not only does the World Bank differ significantly in substance 
from a partnership in a major private accounting or management 
consulting firm, but it does not provide similar 
responsibilities or opportunities, because it compensates 
plaintiff on a schedule •very similar to the U.S. federal 
government's civil service pay system.• 1990 Tr. at 136. As 
the Court expressed during trial, •anyone with business skills 
who wants to mitigate should never go to work for the 
government." 1990 Tr. at 138. 
As the foregoing demonstrates, plaintiff's efforts to 
find a position similar to a Price Waterhouse partnership were 
negligible and do not satisfy her duty to mitigat~. ~' iL..9..L, 
Sangster v. United Air Lines. Inc., 633 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 
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1980), cert. denied, 451 u.s. 971 (1981); Joshi, 48 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. at 658-59. This significantly limits her right to 
any monetary recovery. Indeed, the failure to mitigate 
necessarily forecloses the availability of any front pay. ~' 
~, Dominic v. Consolidated Edison co., 822 F.2d 1249, 
1257-58 (2d Cir. 1987) (failure to mitigate completely 
forecloses the availability of front pay). Accord Hansard v. 
Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1470 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied. 110 s. ct. 129 (1989); ~~Whittlesey 
v. Union Carbide Corp,, 742 F.2d 724, 727-29 (2d Cir. 1984); 
Blizzard v. Newport News Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 
635 F. Supp. 23, 26 (E.D. Va 1985) ("it would seem inequitable 
to require the defendant to pay the plaintiff 'front pay'" 
where plaintiff failed to mitigate). "[F]ront pay is intended 
to be temporary in nature," Cassino. 817 F.2d at 1347, and "the 
plaintiff's duty to mitigate [damages] must serve as a control 
on front pay damage awards." Id. 
Plaintiff's front pay calculations are also wholly 
speculative and are legally insufficient to provide the factual 
predicate for a front pay award. Plaintiff's expert ~ssumed 
both that she would have remained with Price Waterhouse for the 
remaining 21 years until her retirement at age 60, and that she 
will remain in her present World Bank position, where her 
earnings are lower than they would have been at Price 
Waterhouse, until the year 2004. These assumptions are 
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unfounded.1.4./ and cannot f o rm the bas i s o f a f ront pay award . 
~' .e.......g_._, Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co . , 652 F. Supp. 
815, 819-20 (S.D.N.Y . 1986) (rejecting 52-year old plaintiff's 
request for front pay until retirement age because "an award of 
front pay that assumes that Dominic will stay in his present 
lower paying job and awards him compensation for the difference 
between that job and what he would have earned at ConEd until 
he reaches the age of 70 is highly speculative " ), aff'd, 822 
F.2d 1249 , 1257-58 (2d Ci r. 1987). Compare Davis v. Combustion 
Engineering. Inc . , 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(recognizing the uncertainties of awarding front pay to a 
41-year old employee until retirement); Bonura v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank. N.A., 629 F. Supp. 353, 362-63 n.3 (S . D.N.Y. 
1986) (rejecting requests of two plaintiffs, ages 54 and 59, 
for front pay until age 70 as unduly speculative), aff'd, 795 
F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1986) . 
Similarly, although plaintiff's expert acknowledged 
the economic "uncertainty about the accounting industry. 
as a whole," he did no independent investigation of it in 
projecting the profitability of Price Waterhouse in the 
ll/ Plaintiff's expert admitted that his assumption that 
plaintiff would have remained at Price Waterhouse until age 60 
was "not based on any specific information." 1990 Tr. at 116. 
~ li..5..Q id. at 146-48. Plaintiff did not testify that she 
would have remained with Price Waterhouse for the duration of 
her career and 10 of the 47 partners in plaintiff's class of 
1983 have already left the firm. J.d. at 215. Furthermore, the 
partner attrition rate at Price Waterhouse has increased 
steadily over the _ last decade. Id, 
- 35 -
f utu r e. 1990 Tr . a t 128 , 167 . Hi s p r ojecti ons of s i gnificant 
share value increases in the near future conflict markedly with 
actua l recent history . See Def. Ex. Al8. Furthermore, over 
one-half of the undiscounted loss projected by plaintiff was 
based upon her presumed participation in a Price Waterhouse 
retirement plan, based upon speculative projections of the 
firm ' s presumed profitability for the next 36 years, on the 
unproven assumption that plaintiff would have stayed with the 
firm until she retired at age 60. 
However, due to changes in the accounting profession 
in recent years, the business environment has become risky, 
unpredictable and uncertain. 1990 Tr. at 256-61, 348-49. 
Moreover, because the Price Waterhouse retirement benefits are 
unvested, a partner who leaves the firm prior to age 55 is 
entitled to no benefits . .Id. at 255-56. The benefits are also 
unfunded; therefore, if the firm becomes insolvent, no benefits 
are paid to retired partners. 1..d. In any one year, the 
aggregate retirement benefits that can be paid are limited to 
15\ of that year ' s profits. ~Def . Ex. A2-A3. Plaintiff's 
expert failed to take any of these factors into account (1990 
Tr. at 150-69) and when discounting the resulting substantial 
projected future losses to present value, he used a rate of 
5.8\, Pl. Ex. A3, which is far too low and amounts to sheer 
guesswork given the substantial uncertainties in the accounting 
profession mentioned above, as well as the unlimited personal 
liability of partners. ~ 1990 Tr. at 346-48. 
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Pl a i ntiff' s f ront pay me t hodo logy trea ts this case as 
if it were a tort case in which the defendant's conduct has 
eliminated the plaintiff's ability to perform her profession of 
management consulting. However, the 1983 decision to defer 
plaintiff's partnership candidacy did nothing of the sort. To 
award plaintiff partnership earnings until "her life expectancy 
in 2025" even though plaintiff had a reasonable chance to 
attain a position with comparable income in 1984, and in the 
face of plaintiff"s assertion that she retains the ability and 
expertise to perform as a partner at any other Big Eight firm 
(1990 Tr. at 75}, not only would bestow an unjust windfall on 
plaintiff, but would discourage her from seeking such a 
position in the future. In short, plaintiff wants all the 
benefits of a Price Waterhouse partnership for the rest of her 
life with none of the work, risk, responsibilities or 
uncertainties. She wants to be "catapult[ed]. into a 
better position than she would have enjoyed in the absence of 
discrimination." Ford Motor Co., 458 u.s. at 234. 
The record reflects that plaintiff could have found a 
position providing earnings and opportunities comparable to a 
Price Waterhouse partnership in the ten months after she was 
told she would not be reproposed for partner.ill ~, ~, 
1990 Tr. at 285, 331-32. Plaintiff's monetary recovery, if 
ll/ Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, Pl. Br. at 9, the 
compensation levels at other major accounting and consulting 
firms were and are comparable to the compensation levels at 
Price Waterhouse. 1990 Tr. at 186, 194-95, 205, 268, 285-87. 
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any , must therefore be limi ted to back pay amount i ng to the 
difference between plaintiff ' s actual earnings and the 
compensation of partners in the class of 1983 for a period 
extending no later than June 30, 1984. 
IV 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A DECREE 
REGULATING THE PRICE WATERHOUSE PARTNERSHIP 
IN THE FUTURE MUST BE DENIED 
Assuming the Court finds liability, the Court's decree 
with respect to relief for plaintiff should be limited to an 
award of back pay for a one-year period. Plaintiff requests an 
injunction against future Title VII violations and, inter .a.l.i_g, 
would require Price Waterhouse to institute "a written policy" 
against sex discrimination in the partner selection process 
that screens partner evaluations for those that appear to be 
the product of sex stereotyping and disciplines partners who 
. "---
make such comments. ~Pl.Proposed Decree at 1-2. Such 
injunctive relief is wholly unwarranted, unduly intrusive and -----
must be denied. 
Plaintiff concedes that Pri~e Waterhouse has already 
instituted a practice of screening partnership evaluations to 
purge those that might possibly include gender-based comments. 
Pl. Br. at 11; 1990 Tr. at 254-55. Immediately after this 
Court's decision, Price Waterhouse took decisive steps to 
"stamp .. . . out" anything improper or inappropriate in its 
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partnership selection process. There is absolutely no evidence 
of any historical or continuing discrimination at the firm, and 
"[a]bsent convincing evidence [to the contrary courts] will not 
find that [a] defendant continue[s] to discriminate .. 
Hartman v. Wick, 678 F. Supp. at 340. 
" 
Under these circumstances, it would be inappropriate 
to enter a decree that goes beyond providing back pay relief to 
the individual plaintiff in this case. ~' .e.........g_,_, Johnson v. 
Brock, 810 F.2d 219, 225-26 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (defendant's "past 
practices [did] not suggest the callous disregard for the goals 
of Title VII which necessitate injunctive relief," and "[t]he 
result of this action has no doubt impressed upon the 
[defendant] its need to exercise greater care in determining 
its employment policies"; therefore, injunctive relief was 
properly denied); Williams v. General Foods Corp •• 492 F.2d 399 
(7th Cir. 1974) (given the defendant's efforts to comply with 
federal law, no injunction necessary);~ v. Financial 
Assurance Inc,. 624 F. Supp. 686, 695 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (denying 
injunctive or affirmative relief where there was "no indication 
that defendants have indulged in any similar discrimiriation in 
the past or that they are likely to do so in the future").li/ 
ll/ Irrespective of this Court's determination as to whether 
or not partnership admission is an authorized or appropriate 
remedy, plaintiff's request for a decree regulating the firm's 
conduct in the future must be rejected. If the Court declines 
to make plaintiff a partner, plaintiff's other claims for 
[Footnote rontinued on next page] 
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CONCLUSION 
If the Court finds that Price Waterhouse is liable to 
plaintiff, plaintiff should recover no more than back pay for 
the period July 1, 1983 through June 30, 1984. 
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ll/ [Footnote continued from previous page] 
affirmative relief in the decree are moot. ~ -~' ~, ~ v. 
Amarillo Equity Investors. Inc., 102 F. Supp. 256, 260 {D. 
Colo. 1988) (plaintiff's claim for a decree is moot absent 
reinstatement). On the other hand, if the Court compels 
plaintiff's admission into the partnership, Title VII does not 
afford authority to regulate the resulting relationship. S.e.e. 
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984) (Powell, J., 
concurring) ("the Court's opinion should not be read as 
extending Title VII to ... the relationship among partners"). 
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